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The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
from Germany’s perspective 
Marta Zawilska-Florczuk
Germany is one of the eight EU member states which participate in the 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region along with Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. Germany had a positive ap-
proach to the EUSBSR strategy (see Appendix 1) right from planning stage. 
This project contributed to the continuation of Germany’s co-operation 
with the countries in this region, which has been conducted since the mid 
1980s mainly by German federal states. Germany is playing a major role as 
part of this strategy because it is the coordinator of its three priority areas.
However, the German federal government sees the EUSBSR as a project to 
be implemented at the level of federal states. This has been proven by the 
great activity of three German federal states participating in the strategy 
(Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein) and at the 
same time the low level of engagement from the Bundestag, the federal 
government and expert circles. Furthermore, federal states more often for-
mulate evaluations of the effects of co-operation achieved so far as part of 
the EUSBSR. Still, the relatively low level of Berlin’s engagement does not 
mean that it is not interested in co-operation in the Baltic region as such. 
Germany actively participates in the work of such bodies as the Coun-
cil of the Baltic Sea States or the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission (HELCOM). All German entities engaged in the strategy make 
its future attractiveness and the success of individual projects as part of 
it dependent on including Russia in the EUSBSR. As long as Germany 
has the opportunity of regional co-operation with Russia at other forums 
(for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States), it is unlikely to be-
come more engaged in developing the strategy and enhancing co-operation 
as part of this project. 
The significance of the Baltic region for Germany 
The Baltic Sea region is not a priority area within the EU from Berlin’s point of view. 
The northern German federal states, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Mecklenburg- 
-Vorpommern, for which Baltic co-operation offered opportunities of economic development, 
the establishment of trade partnerships and – last but not least – a guarantee of security in 
the region, were the forerunners of German engagement in this region. The federal govern-
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ment became involved in the co-operation much later, seeing it primarily as a chance for 
resolving ecological problems. 
The political engagement of German federal states in the co-operation with countries from 
the Baltic Sea region dates back to the 1980s. The idea of a ‘new Hansa’, i.e. the creation 
of a network of economic, cultural and institutional connections between the countries and 
regions situated by the Baltic Sea, which had belonged to the Hanseatic League, appeared 
in 1987 upon the initiative of Björn Engholm, former prime minister of Schleswig-Holstein. 
This co-operation was to be aimed at the rapid development of this federal state, which 
was among the poorest in Germany, and at intensifying trade with Scandinavian countries. 
This was also a response to the small role the Baltic Sea was playing in German foreign 
policy at that time1. Schleswig-Holstein initiated a number of transborder initiatives in the 
areas of economy, science, culture and youth exchange. In the 1990s, it was the most ac-
tive German federal state in terms of co-operation in the Baltic Sea region. 
The other two federal states located by the Baltic Sea (Hamburg and Mecklenburg- 
-Vorpommern) joined this co-operation in the 1990s and later2, when as a consequence of 
the fall of communism the spectre of potential co-operation partners in this region broadened3 
and the possibility of using European funds as part of the neighbourhood policy emerged. 
The goals of joint action in the Baltic Sea 
region at that time, in addition to eco-
nomic co-operation, also included ensur-
ing security in the region and supporting 
Eastern European countries in their sys-
tem transformation and efforts to inte-
grate with the EU and NATO structures. 
Initially, the Baltic policy was conducted 
by the federal states (especially Schleswig- 
-Holstein) independently of Germany’s 
foreign policy and even in opposition to it4. The federal states have been successful in their 
consistent activity and lobbying for federal politicians to develop a greater interest in the 
Baltic Sea region since Germany joined the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1992 and 
later on other organisations were established to improve the co-operation between the 
countries in the region (including the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference and the Union 
of the Baltic Cities). Berlin attaches especially great significance to issues of environmental 
protection, including combating the pollution of the Baltic Sea and maintaining its biodiver-
sity. For this reason Germany is active in the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Com-
mission (HELCOM). One of the effects of the federal government’s noticing the significance 
of the Baltic Sea region was the appointment of a commissioner for the Baltic Sea at the 
Chancellor’s Office in 2000–2005. This position has been replaced by that of a Federal 
Government Coordinator of the Maritime Industry at the Ministry of Economics, whose 
function is reduced solely to coordinating and supervising Germany’s activities supporting 
the development of the maritime economy (primarily the shipbuilding and port industries). 
Although Germany officially joined a number of regional organisations at the federal level, 
the individual federal states are still much more active in them than the central government. 
It needs to be admitted that Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein 
grant various degrees of priority to Baltic co-operation; they still coordinate their activity, 
for example, by appointing their representative, each time from a different federal state, 
at the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Before the EU enlargement of 2004, when Central 
and Eastern European countries joined it, regional organisations were the only bodies which 
enabled co-operation between countries in this region. Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein 
in 2000–2006 used the EU structural funds, INTERREG, to a much greater extent than 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Cf. N. Werz, J. Bonin, J. Edler, 
U. Fabricius, Ch. Krüger, 
H. Saldik, Kooperation im 
Ostseeraum, in: Rostocker 
Informationen zu Politik 
und Verwaltung, no. 24, 
Universität Rostock Insititut 
für Politik- und Verwaltungswis-
senschaften, Rostock 2005. 
2 Hamburg started co-operation 
after 2000, when the Baltic 
states had been assured of 
their accession to the EU.
3 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
could not become engaged 
earlier since this federal state 
was part of East Germany. 
Hamburg, one of the wealthi-
est federal states, became 
open to co-operation with 
countries from the Baltic Sea 
region motivated by the po-
tential offered by new Eastern 
European markets.
4 This primarily concerned the 
support offered by Schleswig- 
-Holstein to the aspirations 
of the Baltic states to join 
the EU and NATO, which 
in the opinion of the federal 
government could lead to ten-
sion in relations with Russia.
The Baltic Sea region is not a priority 
area within the EU from Berlin’s point 
of view. The northern German federal 
states, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg 
and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
were the forerunners of German 
engagement in this region. 
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in the later period. Furthermore, before the EU was enlarged to include Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia along with other new member states, a network of well-functioning 
organisations and also partnerships at the local and non-governmental levels had been cre-
ated, owing to which most of the tasks the federal states assigned themselves were fulfilled 
(for example, ensuring security in the region and establishing economic co-operation). 
Before 2004, the federal states’ activities were closely linked to the central government’s 
policy aimed at establishing the closest possible bonds between the Central and Eastern 
European countries and the European Union. After the EU’s enlargement, the priorities 
which the interest of German federal states in co-operation with other Baltic Sea regions 
and countries depended on changed. The main focus of interest shifted to ecological and 
energy issues and the closest possible co-operation with Russia. Co-operation with Rus-
sia is seen as a precondition for the success of projects implemented in the region, mainly 
in the areas of environmental protection and energy. 
The engagement in planning and the implementation 
of the strategy at the federal level is low
Plans for creating a macro-regional strategy in the region have met with ambivalent reac-
tions in Germany. The federal states were actively engaged in its planning, while the central 
government was showing significantly less interest. This was due to the relatively low at-
tractiveness of the strategy – which did not have a budget of its own – in comparison to 
other co-operation forums in the region. Berlin’s lack of enthusiasm has also resulted from 
the fact that the EUSBSR is an internal EU strategy, which does not guarantee Russia the 
possibility of participation on equal terms. 
Central institutions joined in the development of the German stance on the first planned EU 
macro-regional policy at a very late stage. The issue of establishing closer co-operation in 
the Baltic Sea region has been raised on just a few occasions during Bundestag sessions. 
However, what was being discussed was not the strategy itself but Germany’s activity 
as part of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and 
HELCOM. MPs emphasised the need to narrow down the profile of activity, especially of the 
former two institutions, in order to focus on specific projects. The excessively broad range 
of activity and the fact that the goals of these initiatives had been formulated in overly gen-
eral terms were criticised. The government did not take an official stance on this strategy, 
as it did with the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, which was developed two years later. 
Only the three interested federal states 
brought their contribution to the consul-
tations conducted by the European Com-
mission. The political parties in Germany 
at the federal level were not particularly 
interested in the EUSBSR at the phase of 
its planning, either. The Green Party was 
the most active (which was manifested, 
for example, through questions addressed 
by MPs to the federal government) because of ecological problems, which are of key signifi-
cance for Germany in the context of co-operation in the Baltic Sea region. Shortly before the 
strategy was adopted, factions from the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which then were members 
of the grand coalition, brought a motion at the Bundestag forum appealing for the federal 
government to grant its full support to the strategy and to become engaged in the project5. 
At the planning stage, this strategy was not a subject of public debate in Germany, in the 
media and even in expert circles. With the exception of the Berlin-based Science and Poli-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/16/131/1613171.pdf
The fact that the national coordinator’s 
office has been located at the Foreign 
Ministry proves that Germany is not atta-
ching great significance to this strategy, 
since the European policy is coordina-
ted primarily by the Chancellor’s Office.
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tics Foundation, which published a text devoted to the EUSBSR in 20096, German analyti-
cal circles did not publish any papers devoted to this strategy7. 
At the central level, Germany is in charge of the priority area ‘To preserve natural zones 
and biodiversity, including in fisheries’ as part of Pillar I of the strategy ‘To make the Baltic 
Sea Region an environmentally sustainable place.’ This area of priority is coordinated by the 
Ministry for the Environment. The function of the EUSBSR contact point in Germany, which 
acts as a national coordinator between units in charge of implementing individual projects, 
is performed by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs8. The fact that the national coordina-
tor’s office has been located at the Foreign Ministry proves that Germany is not attaching 
great significance to this strategy. According to the unwritten distribution of competences 
within the German government, European policy is coordinated primarily by the Chancel-
lor’s Office. The Baltic Sea region is not a priority for the federal government. Much more 
significant in terms of internal security, immigration and economy are the southern federal 
states9, which are richer and keep trade contacts with the Balkan states, which Germany 
sees as promising markets. With the exception of Hamburg, the federal states participat-
ing in the EUSBSR are among the poorest and delegate a small number of representatives 
to the Bundesrat (the house of German parliament which co-decides on issues pertaining 
to the federal states)10. 
The priorities of the federal states: 
ecology, energy, tourism and education
The German federal states located on the Baltic Sea coast enthusiastically responded to 
the EU Council’s proposal to create a strategy for the Baltic Sea region and became actively 
engaged in the process of developing it. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein 
were the most active. Two years since the implementation of this strategy, their enthusi-
asm has somewhat waned. This is so because the co-operation between the countries 
and organisations in this region, which had already been well-developed, has not been sig-
nificantly enhanced. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is the most active federal state at present 
because, being one of the poorest federal states in Germany, it has the most to gain from 
regional co-operation. 
Although Schleswig-Holstein was strongly engaged at the stage of strategy planning, it was 
not entrusted with coordinating any of the priority areas as part of the EUSBSR. Neverthe-
less, this federal state takes part in numerous projects, primarily in the area of ecology. 
It positively evaluates the combination of the existing forms of co-operation in the region. 
The political goals of the strategy, 
according to the government of Schleswig-
Holstein, include primarily preventing the 
emergence of an economic divide between 
the eastern and western parts of the region 
during the economic crisis and improv-
ing the ecological condition of the Baltic 
Sea. In the opinion of Schleswig-Holstein, 
the most important project is Clean Baltic Shipping, which covers, for example, the creation 
of a network of power plants to supply ships with power at ports and introducing charges 
for using port infrastructure and maritime routes, the rates of which would depend on the 
level of emissions11. Schleswig-Holstein is also engaged (at the level of the federal state’s 
prime minister) in the development of regional identity and supports the idea of creating 
a common history handbook for all the countries participating in the strategy. The most im-
portant partners for Schleswig-Holstein in this region are southern Denmark, the Pomerania 
6 P. Krumrey, C. Schymik, 
EU-Strategie für den Ostseer-
aum, SWP Arbeitspapiere, 
no. 5, 2009,  
http://www.swp-berlin.org/
fileadmin/contents/products/
arbeitspapiere/Diskussions-
papier_KS_Gesamtentwurf03_
final.pdf
7 One of the few opinions 
regarding this issue was the 
speech given by Kurt Bodewig 
(SPD), the federal minister 
for transport, construction 
industry and urban develop-
ment in 2000–2002, 
and the president of the Baltic 
Sea Forum, just before the 
strategy officially came into 
force. Bodewig emphasised 
that the strategy was the first 
initiative of this kind to offer 
a chance for combining 
the already existing actions 
in the region at the European, 
national and regional levels. 
He saw it as an opportunity 
to strengthen co-operation 
in the region and to avoi 
 the danger of isolating 
Russia as the only Baltic 
state which is outside Europe. 
In Bodewig’s opinion, 
economic and energy issues 
(especially securing stable 
supplies of energy to the 
region) and improving the re-
gion’s competitiveness should 
play the most important role 
in the strategy.  
8 Division E 07 (its tasks include 
regional co-operation 
in Northern Europe) as part 
of the EU Coordination Group.
9 This has been proven by 
the fact that the federal 
government has been engaged 
much more in the EU Strategy 
for the Danube Region.
10 Hamburg and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern delegate three 
representatives each 
and Schleswig-Holstein 
delegates four. 
 
 
 
 
11 Cf. for example: http://www.
schleswig-holstein.de/STK/DE/
Schwerpunkte/EuropaOstsee-
politik/OstseeNordseeangele-
genheiten/Ostseekooperation/
ostseestrategie.html
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is the most 
active federal state at present because, 
being one of the poorest federal states 
in Germany, it has the most to gain 
from regional co-operation. 
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12 Cf. http://www.fdphamburg.
de/wp-content/documents/
lpt/2011-08/12-11-ostsee.pdf
province in Poland and north-western Russia. Schleswig-Holstein’s government emphasises 
the need to allow Russia to participate in the EUSBSR to the greatest extent possible by 
using the instruments available as part of the Northern Dimension and the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States. It has also emphasised that Russia’s non-engagement in the development 
of the goals and priorities of this strategy may lead to conflicts and the failure to achieve 
satisfactory effects of the actions taken, especially in the field of ecology.
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern became engaged in concept work and the implementation 
of the guidelines of the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region at a very early stage. Many de-
bates have been devoted to co-operation as part of this strategy in the local parliament. 
The office of the prime minister of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and the ministries directly 
involved have also prepared and issued many publications concerning this subject. 
Linking the previous lines of policy adopted by Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in the region and 
the strategy guidelines is the most important thing for this federal state. This is also playing 
a great role in the context of financing EUSBSR projects. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is the 
coordinator of the Tourism programme as part of the priority area ‘To maintain and rein-
force the attractiveness of the Baltic Sea 
Region in particular through education, 
youth, tourism, culture and health’ under 
the third pillar of this strategy, ‘To make 
the Baltic Sea Region an accessible and 
attractive place.’ Tourism is at the same 
time the most important branch of this 
federal state’s economy. Ecological and 
infrastructural issues are also of great sig-
nificance for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
It is engaged in projects aimed at protect-
ing the natural environment and improving 
transport connections, especially ‘green’ 
ones (railway, bicycle paths, tram connections, etc.). Energy issues, especially in the area 
of ‘green’ energy sources, including wind and geothermal energy, are also important. Over 
33% of the energy produced in this federal state already originates from wind power plants. 
The government of this federal state is expecting that the EUSBSR will first of all help to 
open a network of connections between wind farms in the Baltic region. This fits in with its 
energy strategy since it aims to derive all its energy from renewable sources in the future. 
In the opinion of the government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, one of the most significant 
tasks of the EUSBSR is to strengthen co-operation with Russia.
Hamburg was the last to become interested in co-operation in the Baltic Sea region be-
cause it is not situated immediately on the Baltic shoreline. As part of the EUSBSR, this 
federal state coordinates the Education and Youth programme as part of the priority area 
‘To maintain and reinforce the attractiveness of the Baltic Sea Region in particular through 
education, youth, tourism, culture and health’ (third pillar). This way it combines the two 
areas of regional co-operation which are the most important from its point of view: economy 
and science. As part of the priority it coordinates, Hamburg wants to build a network of 
co-operation and exchange between schools, vocational training centres and higher educa-
tion institutions (see Appendix 2). Hamburg is also involved in promoting the possibilities 
of co-operation between small and medium-sized firms and higher education institutions. 
One of its goals is to create a science and culture space, including the Baltic Society and 
a chair dealing with the harmonisation of law in the countries from the Baltic Sea region12, 
and also by supporting Slavic and Scandinavian studies at universities as well as projects 
devoted to history, geography, sociology and the economy of the region. Hamburg would 
Hamburg was the last to become 
interested in co-operation in the Baltic 
Sea region because it is not situated 
immediately on the Baltic shoreline. 
The government of this federal state 
expects that the strategy will contrib-
ute to economic development and will 
boost employment levels in the region, 
as well as develop infrastructure and 
improve security in maritime transport.
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13 Cf. http://www.hamburg.de/
ostseeraum/2835784/eu-ost-
seestrategie.html
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 C. Schymik, 
Modellversuch Makroregion, 
SWP Studien, 2011,  
http://www.swp-berlin.org/
fileadmin/contents/products/
studien/2011_S01_shy_ks.pdf
act as a coordinator and intermediary in this project. Hamburg’s government expects that 
the strategy will contribute to economic development and will boost employment levels in 
the region, as well as develop infrastructure and improve security in maritime transport. 
It also expects support for the development of the Hamburg port. Furthermore, it wishes to 
strengthen the co-operation of metropolitan regions, which is partly an effect of the great 
significance which the partnership of the city of Hamburg and St. Petersburg has for this 
federal state. As with the governments of the other federal states, it also emphasises the 
need to make Russia more involved in the strategy13.
The negative evaluation of the effects the strategy has brought so far 
The German federal states have provided various evaluations two years after the launch of 
the EUSBSR. On the one hand, they positively perceive the activation of the EU member 
states from this region, which the strategy has encouraged. They are, however, criticising 
the overly optimistic goals of the strategy, the excessive number of projects and the lack of 
coherent coordination, and especially the insufficient level of engagement from the non-EU 
Baltic countries in the projects being implemented as part of the strategy. 
The German evaluation of the results 
the EUSBSR has brought so far is to 
a great extent an effect of the experi-
ences of the federal states engaged in 
it. As during the consultations before its 
implementation, the central government 
is not participating in the discussion 
on the implementation of this strategy. 
The Berlin-based Science and Politics 
Foundation, an advisory body to the Ger-
man government, is criticising the impre-
cise definition of the means by which the 
goals of the strategy are to be achieved 
and emphasises the need to introduce a system for controlling the effects on the basis 
of specific, measurable indicators14. 
The federal states can see many positive changes which have been achieved since the im-
plementation of the strategy. The most important one, in their opinion, is the activation of 
the states participating in the EUSBSR, whose level of engagement in the work of regional 
institutions was different before. On the other hand, the federal states are criticising the 
central government for its insufficient engagement in individual projects and its delayed and 
tardy implementation of the priorities set by the strategy. They are also pointing to prob-
lems with appointing the units in charge of individual projects. The federal states are also 
complaining about the imprecise definition of the goals and criteria for project choice. Last 
but not least, critical opinions have also been expressed about the insufficient (according 
to the federal states) engagement by non-EU member states from this region and organisa-
tions such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, HELCOM, etc. in the implementation of 
the EUSBSR. They are also pointing to the lack of a separate budget for financing individual 
projects and also the too slow and insufficient inclusion of Russia in them. In their opinion, 
it will be necessary to develop long-term projects in the future, i.e. projects whose financing 
would not be limited to funds already available within the current EU budget. To improve 
the strategy’s effectiveness, it will also be necessary to reinforce the parliamentary aspect 
of co-operation in the Baltic Sea region through constant engagement of national and re-
gional parliaments in the implementation and evaluation of EUSBSR projects. 
Germany positively perceives the 
activation of the EU member states 
from this region, which the strategy 
has encouraged. But it is also 
criticising the overly optimistic goals 
of the strategy and the lack of coherent 
coordination, and especially insufficient 
level of engagement from the non-EU 
Baltic countries in the projects being 
implemented as part of the strategy.
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15 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/
Reden/2011/110829-ST_Hoy-
er_BSPC.html?nn=581864
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Speech by Member of Euro-
pean Parliament, Hermann 
Kuhn (Green Party) during 
the session of the Parliamen-
tary Commission for European 
Affairs on 12 January 2011.  
http://www.landtag.ltsh.
de/infothek/wahl17/
aussch/europa/nieder-
schrift/2011/17-023_01-11.
html
Conclusions
1. The Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is treated by the German government mainly 
as a regional project. This has been proven by Berlin’s relatively low level of engagement 
in its implementation, which at the same time was much more active in the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the priorities and projects of which partly overlap with the 
EUSBSR. The possibilities of the co-operation with Russia are a reason for this since this 
is of key significance for Germany in the context of co-operation in the Baltic Sea region. 
Common projects are much easier to implement as part of the CBSS, which Russia is 
a full member of. The significance of co-operation with Russia is also emphasised by all 
the German federal states participating in the strategy. Therefore, it may be expected 
that they will be making efforts to combine the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region with 
the EU Northern Dimension to create a basis to allow Russia to participate more fully 
in projects as part of this strategy. 
2. Closer co-operation with Norway and Belarus is not likely to be sought as part of this 
strategy. No such suggestion has been made in the German stances at the level of 
the central government or the federal states. Co-operation with Norway is good within 
the framework of other bodies, while Belarus is not seen by Germany as a trustworthy 
partner (one proof of which was the speech given by Werner Hoyer, secretary of state 
at the German Foreign Ministry, on the occasion of the official inauguration of the Ger-
man presidency of the CBSS to be held in 2011–201215). 
3. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is currently the most active federal state involved in the 
EUSBSR. This is because this federal state joined regional co-operation later than the 
other two and, being the poorest federal state, relies more heavily on EU subsidies. 
Consequently, it is more ready than the other federal states to participate in regional 
projects aimed, for example, at improving its own infrastructure. The fact that it is in 
charge of the Tourism programme serves its interests because tourism is the most 
important branch of industry in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. This offers the chance for 
the development of tourism in this region and also competition to Polish tourism by the 
Baltic Sea. 
4. The federal states are likely to push through projects in the area of energy, first of all 
from renewable sources. Energy is mentioned among the priorities of all the federal 
states and in expert commentaries. Since Germany has withdrawn from the use of 
nuclear energy completely, ‘green energy’ is gaining significance. Germany is likely to 
make efforts to develop energy networks in the region in order to ensure the possibility 
of transmitting the energy produced by it and better access to outlets for itself. 
5. Despite the ambivalent evaluations of the effects the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
has given so far, Germany will still support other EU macro-regional strategies. Follow-
ing the adoption of the Strategy for the Danube Region in April 2011, Germany is likely 
to support the creation of a strategy for the North Sea region. Schleswig-Holstein is al-
ready supporting its adoption16. This strategy, according to Germany, would be based to 
a great extent on the experiences gained during the implementation of the Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region, since similar problems which need closer co-operation exist in 
both regions: the maritime economy, protection of the natural environment, combating 
the consequences of climate change and, last but not least, energy policy. Criticism of 
the present manner of financing macro-regional strategies gives grounds for the conclu-
sion that in future Germany will support the creation of a separate fund for financing 
the projects it envisages. 
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A p p e N d i c e s
1. European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
The European Council adopted the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in October 2009. This is the first pilot EU macro-
regional strategy to bring together several member states located in one geographical area. The implementation of the EUS-
BSR was intended to contribute to a more efficient resolution of the region’s problems, such as the pollution of the waters 
of the Baltic Sea, economic imbalance, infrastructural differences and security problems. This strategy was to bring about 
closer co-operation between EU member states located on the Baltic Sea coast and at the same time to enable the inclusion 
of Russia, Norway and Belarus as essential countries in this region in this co-operation (especially in the context of resolving 
ecological problems). The assumption is that EU macro-regional strategies do not involve additional institutions, funds and 
legal acts. Thus the EUSBSR is a platform which brings together the already existing economic, cultural and environment 
protection initiatives at intergovernmental, regional, NGO and other levels. This strategy encompasses four pillars: 
I. To make the Baltic Sea region an environmentally sustainable place,
II. To make the Baltic Sea region a prosperous place, 
III. To make the Baltic Sea region an accessible and attractive place, 
IV. To make the Baltic Sea region a safe and secure place.
This strategy has been treated from the very beginning as a test in closer regional co-operation for EU member states 
which – if passed – could also be transferred to other regions. Although the effects of the EUSBSR have not been 
evaluated positively in all cases, another strategy, for the Danube region, was launched already in the first half of 2011. 
Additionally, more strategies are being considered, for example, for the North Sea, the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea regions.
2. Selected projects coordinated by Germany 
Project name Content Coordinator
Creation of protected marine areas Determining the Natura 2000 network within the Baltic Sea area Germany (Ministry 
for the Environment)
Baltic Sea Labour Network Improving the management of the common labour 
market in the Baltic Sea region and its harmonisation 
with the use of transnational strategies
Hamburg (Office 
for Science and 
Scientific Research)
BSR-Quick Improving the qualifications of the owners and employees 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) through 
academic education and vocational training 
Hamburg 
(Hanse Parlament 
e.V. association)
Developing strategies for sustainable tourism Improving the accessibility of the natural, cultural and 
historical legacy of the countries from the Baltic Sea 
region for tourism and indicating the features of shared 
identity of the Baltic Sea region
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
(University 
of Greifswald)
Promoting the exchange of school 
students and developing a ring of 
partner schools around the Baltic Sea
School exchange aimed at language learning and 
promoting mutual knowledge and understanding 
among young people in the region
Hamburg
Sustainable Production through Innovation 
in Small and Medium sized Enterprises
Improving the innovativeness potential of SME in order 
to reinforce sustainable production processes and to boost profits 
at firms, while reducing their economic and environmental costs
Germany
